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INTRODUCTION 
The American legal system depends on broad legal standards 
and tests to flexibly apply the law to many unique situations. Chief 
Justice John Marshall espoused the judiciary’s role in creating such 
tests to safeguard citizens from unconstitutional government action.1 
In some situations, however, judicially created legal tests are 
unnecessarily broad and have the potential to disadvantage classes of 
individuals—even when those tests aim to protect constitutional 
privileges such as the freedom from compelled self-incrimination.2 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina found itself analyzing 
such a test when it recently considered a case involving an individual’s 
Miranda rights. A case of first impression in North Carolina,3 State v. 
Hammonds4 considered the custody status of an involuntarily 
committed individual for Miranda purposes.5 The Hammonds court 
applied the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. 
Arizona,6 which evaluated the constitutionality of admitting into 
evidence “statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way”7 when law enforcement failed to afford the defendant 
“procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination.”8 Regarding custody, the Miranda Court answered 
with a legal standard that ultimately developed into a purportedly 
 
 *  © 2019 David B. Wall. 
 1. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the 
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3. State v. Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. 602, 622, 777 S.E.2d 359, 372 (2015) (Inman, 
J., dissenting) (“The issue of whether and in what circumstances police questioning of an 
involuntarily committed person is custodial is one of first impression in North Carolina.”), 
rev’d, 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017). 
 4. 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017). 
 5. Id. at 159, 804 S.E.2d at 439–40. 
 6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 7. Id. at 445.  
 8. Id. at 444.  
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“one-size-fits-all” test.9 To receive the protections offered by 
Miranda, an individual must be in custody—a status that a court 
determines by considering the “totality of the circumstances”10 as to 
whether “there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of 
movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.”11 
Considering the custody status of involuntarily committed 
persons, the Supreme Court of North Carolina flatly rejected a 
custody per se designation in favor of discerning custody on a case-by-
case basis.12 Under a custody per se designation, an individual is 
presumptively in custody when a certain condition is met,13 unless the 
prosecution can rebut this presumption by showing that an exception 
applies.14 The court’s rejection of this approach in Hammonds is 
problematic because of the resulting coercive pressures that 
involuntarily committed individuals experience when their liberty is 
restricted regardless of whether they committed a crime. Because the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina failed to adequately weigh these 
coercive pressures, it erred in applying the one-size-fits-all approach 
to the involuntarily committed.  
This Recent Development addresses the complications of the 
totality-of-the-circumstances custody approach for the involuntarily 
committed and argues that the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
should have adopted a custody per se rule. In its current form, the 
totality-of-the-circumstances test will encroach on the constitutional 
privilege to be free from compelled self-incrimination for defendants 
who are involuntarily committed because these individuals experience 
preemptive and significant restrictions on liberty and are subjected to 
coercion by law enforcement as a result. The one-size-fits-all 
approach, in practice, does not fit all. 
 
 9. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1529 (2008). 
 10. Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 162, 804 S.E.2d at 442 (quoting State v. Buchanan, 533 
N.C. 332, 339, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001)). 
 11. Id. (quoting Buchanan, 533 N.C. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828). 
 12. Id. at 165–66, 804 S.E.2d at 443–44. 
 13. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 504–05 (2012) (reviewing the Sixth Circuit’s 
holding that “isolation from the general prison population combined with questioning 
about conduct occurring outside the prison makes any such interrogation custodial per 
se”); Luis Then, Note, Applying the ‘Cuffs: Consistency and Clarity in a Bright-Line Rule 
for Arrest-Like Restraints Under Miranda Custody, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 843, 863 (2016) 
(“[A]ny individual subjected to arrest-like restraints—such as being placed in handcuffs or 
into the back of a police car, or having weapons drawn on him—is in custody for purposes 
of Miranda.”). 
 14. See Then, supra note 13, at 863. 
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Part I of the analysis introduces Miranda, its progeny, and the 
facts and ruling of Hammonds. Part II discusses why the involuntarily 
committed require a different custody standard that provides 
additional protection. Part III explains the flaw in rejecting custody 
per se for the involuntarily committed and proposes a bright-line 
solution while showing that the new rule will not greatly disrupt the 
protections offered by Miranda and its progeny. 
I.  BACKDROP: FROM MIRANDA TO HAMMONDS 
Over four decades have passed since the Supreme Court decided 
Miranda.15 Since then, the decision has facilitated a national 
discussion about balancing appropriate protections for the accused 
and the ability of law enforcement to thwart and solve crime. The 
doctrine, now cemented in American criminal procedure, is arguably 
one of the most widely recognized legal protections. Nonetheless, 
there have been developments and alterations to Miranda since its 
inception in 1966. A lesser-known aspect of Miranda—the fact that 
someone must be in custody to receive its protections—is the focus of 
this Recent Development.16 This part will first discuss the specific 
aspects of Miranda protection and the test for the requisite finding of 
custody. Second, it will discuss the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina’s custody analysis in Hammonds and its rejection of a 
custody per se designation for the involuntarily committed. 
A. The Miranda Framework and Developments 
Miranda established a basic procedural framework for law 
enforcement when interrogating individuals suspected of crime.17 The 
majority in Miranda sought to “protect persons in all settings in which 
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being 
compelled to incriminate themselves.”18 To this end, the Miranda 
Court created a standard that required “procedural safeguards”19 for 
those who have been “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of 
 
 15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 16. See generally Then, supra note 13 (describing the complex analysis needed to 
determine whether a custodial interrogation occurred).  
 17. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. 
 18. Id. at 467. 
 19. Id. at 478–79 (stating that an individual in custody “must be warned prior to any 
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against 
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he 
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so 
desires”). 
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freedom by the authorities in any significant way .	.	.	.”20 Although the 
safeguards themselves were laid out in a checklist fashion, the 
standard to decide who exactly is “deprive[d]” lacks uniformity 
among the states.21 The clear-cut custody determination in Miranda 
left lower courts to grapple with custody determinations in 
innumerable other, more nuanced scenarios. 
Ultimately, courts have settled on a totality-of-the-circumstances 
test that assesses the degree to which a defendant’s situation mirrors 
the station house at issue in Miranda22 to determine whether an 
individual is in custody. The test considers (1) the circumstances 
surrounding interrogation and (2) within those circumstances, 
whether a reasonable person “[would] have felt he or she was [not] at 
liberty to terminate the [interrogation] and leave.”23 Courts must 
objectively determine whether there was either a formal arrest or 
“restraint on freedom of movement” closely enough associated with 
formal arrest.24 Although the Miranda standard for custody is 
considered a rigid one by its supporters and critics alike,25 its 
applicability to specific categories of defendants has nonetheless been 
challenged numerous times.26 
 
 20. Id. at 478. 
 21. See Then, supra note 13, at 858–59 (discussing the two different approaches state 
courts have taken when determining custody). Further, the Miranda Court did not have to 
handle this deprivation of freedom issue because the defendants were arrested, taken to a 
station house, and questioned in an interrogation room, thus leaving little room to argue 
that the defendants were not in police custody. See id. at 846 (citing Leslie A. Lunney, The 
Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 727, 753–54, 768 
(1999)). 
 22. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012). 
 23. State v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 162, 804 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2017) (quoting J.D.B. 
v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011)). 
 24. Id. (quoting State v. Buchanan, 533 N.C. 332, 339, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001)).  
 25. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 282 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(supporting the maintenance of the “rigidity” of Miranda); S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 46 
(1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2132 (criticizing the “rigid and inflexible 
requirements” of the majority opinion in .	.	. Miranda); see also Ellen A. Peters, State 
Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 592 
(1986) (“For better or worse, the prophylactic rules of Miranda are today firmly 
embedded in the legal landscape of the law of self-incrimination.” (footnote omitted)); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 975 (1995) (using Miranda 
as an example that legal rules advantageously “embolden” and “constrain” 
decisionmakers, thereby promoting predictability of legal decisions and enhancing 
visibility and accountability for those enforcing or interpreting the rule).  
 26. See, e.g., Fields, 565 U.S. at 508 (considering whether prisoners are automatically 
in custody for purposes of Miranda); J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 264 (discussing whether a child’s 
age is “relevant” to the custody analysis of Miranda). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1014 (2019) 
1018 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
B. Hammonds and Custody Analysis 
Hammonds illustrates courts’ reluctance to replace the totality-
of-the-circumstances test with a presumption of custody.27 The 
defendant, Tae Kwon Hammonds, was involuntarily committed to a 
local hospital after an intentional overdose.28 A magistrate ordered 
Hammonds’s commitment on the basis that he was “mentally ill and 
dangerous to self or others.”29 Meanwhile, law enforcement suspected 
Hammonds of committing armed robbery the night before his 
commitment based on video surveillance used to identify him.30 The 
day after the magistrate ordered Hammonds’s commitment, officers 
visited Hammonds to question him while he was involuntarily 
committed in the hospital.31 During questioning, Hammonds made 
statements to the police which formed the basis of a criminal charge—
robbery with a dangerous weapon—begging the question of whether 
he was in custody at the time of the questioning.32  
The officers, wearing plain clothes, questioned Hammonds for 
nearly an hour and a half and “never informed the defendant he 
could tell them to leave”33 or that he could end the questioning.34 
Though Hammonds had been committed to a hospital after an 
intentional overdose, he was not under the influence of drugs during 
the interrogation, and his nurse allowed the detectives into his room.35 
Despite Hammonds being “repeatedly told he was not under 
arrest,”36 nor handcuffed,37 he was under continuous supervision by a 
 
 27. See Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 164–66, 804 S.E.2d at 443–44; see also Fields, 565 U.S. 
at 508 (declining to find a custody per se designation when an incarcerated individual is 
questioned in an isolated setting about a crime committed outside the prison that was 
separate from the crime for which he was incarcerated). The Fields Court clarified that a 
previous opinion, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), “did not hold that 
imprisonment alone is sufficient to constitute Miranda custody.” Fields, 565 U.S. at 507; 
see also State v. Fisher, 158 N.C. App. 133, 145, 580 S.E.2d 405, 415 (2003) (“An inmate, 
however, is not, because of his incarceration, automatically in custody for the purposes of 
Miranda.” (quoting State v. Briggs, 137 N.C. App. 125, 129, 526 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2000))), 
aff’d per curiam, 358 N.C. 215, 593 S.E.2d 583 (2004). 
 28. Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 159, 804 S.E.2d at 440. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 164, 804 S.E.2d at 442–43. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. at 164, 804 S.E.2d at 443. 
 37. Id.  
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hospital staff member who sat outside Hammonds’s room and 
accompanied him to the restroom.38 
Although these facts were not enough for the trial court to find a 
Miranda violation, the Supreme Court of North Carolina ultimately 
decided in Hammonds’s favor.39 Despite rejecting a custody per se 
designation,40 the court found that Hammonds was subjected to a 
custodial interrogation and thus was entitled to hear his Miranda 
rights prior to the interrogation for two reasons. First, Hammonds 
was “severely restricted” in his freedom of movement by the 
commitment order since he could not leave or move independently 
throughout the hospital.41 Second, Hammonds was in custody because 
the detectives not only failed to inform him that he was free to 
terminate questioning but also because they told him they would 
leave only after he answered their questions.42 Thus, the court found, 
Hammonds was in custody.43 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, despite ruling in favor of 
Hammonds, missed an opportunity to better secure the Fifth 
Amendment privilege for those who are involuntarily committed with 
a custody per se designation.44 As will be discussed below, because 
involuntary commitments implicate procedures and practices that 
infringe on an individual’s liberty prior to criminal conviction, a 
constitutional protection in the form of a custody per se designation is 
necessary to protect those who are committed and subsequently 
questioned by authorities. Essentially, Hammonds gave law 
enforcement a guide on questioning tactics that will pass muster 
before a court, but failed to protect interviewees from the inherent 
coercive pressures of involuntary commitment going forward. Even 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 166, 804 S.E.2d at 444. 
 40. Id.at 167, 804 S.E.2d at 444. 
 41. Id. at 163–64, 804 S.E.2d at 443–44 (explaining that Hammonds’s “freedom of 
movement was already severely restricted,” despite not being handcuffed or otherwise 
restrained, because a hospital staff member supervised Hammonds at all times and 
accompanied him to the bathroom). However, courts have been reluctant to hold that 
restricted movement is a “sufficient” condition for custody. See id.; see also Howes v. 
Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012) (“We have ‘declined to accord talismanic power’ to the 
freedom-of-movement inquiry and have instead asked the additional question whether the 
relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of 
station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984))). 
 42. Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 166, 804 S.E.2d at 444. 
 43. Id. at 166–67, 804 S.E.2d at 444.  
 44. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1014 (2019) 
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though Hammonds secured a favorable verdict, other involuntarily 
committed defendants will not be similarly protected absent a 
presumption of custody. 
II.  THE INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED REQUIRE A DIFFERENT 
STANDARD 
Understanding why the reasoning in Hammonds was flawed 
requires familiarity with involuntary commitment processes and their 
related issues. Scholarship and jurisprudence on involuntary 
commitment show that the practice implicates pressing social and 
legal issues—namely, adequate care for people with psychiatric and 
substance abuse disorders, societal safety, and due process concerns 
for those who are subject to the constraints of commitment.45 In 
addition, those who are mentally ill or addicted to drugs—a large 
population of society—carry substantial risk of being subjected to 
involuntary commitment.46 The balance of societal safety weighed 
against the liberty and health interests of the involuntarily committed 
currently tips heavily in favor of society: the civilly committed are not 
confined because of a crime they have committed but out of fear of a 
crime they may commit. Further, as will be discussed, there is no 
constitutional right for involuntarily committed individuals to receive 
 
 45. See, e.g., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., TREAT OR REPEAT: A STATE SURVEY 
OF SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS, MAJOR CRIMES, AND COMMUNITY TREATMENT 1 (2017), 
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/treat-or-repeat.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BQ85-MNSN] (discussing “each state’s structure and programming” surrounding the care 
for mentally ill individuals who have committed major crimes and advocating for more 
treatment and less jail time for these individuals); see also Austin Baumgarten, Medical 
Treatment Demands Medical Assessment: Substantive Due Process Rights in Involuntary 
Commitments, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 603 (2011) (advocating for “medically based 
evaluations before emergency involuntary commitments” to better protect substantive due 
process rights for the involuntarily committed).  
 46. Bose et al., Key Substance Use and Mental Health Indicators in the United States: 
Results from the 2017 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SAMHSA (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHFFR2017/NSDUHFFR2017.
htm [https://perma.cc/G66G-E5B9] (reporting that “46.6 million adults aged 18 or older (18.9 
percent) had any mental illness .	.	. in the past year” as of 2017 and that 11.2 million adults 
had a serious mental illness). The report also noted that as of 2017, “approximately 19.7 
million people aged 12 or older had a substance abuse disorder.” Id. As will be discussed, 
the requirements for involuntary commitment often include a showing of mental illness or 
substance abuse and a finding that the individual is a danger to themselves or others. See, 
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §	122C-262(a) (2017). For a summary of each state’s involuntary 
commitment statutes, see generally TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., EMERGENCY 
HOSPITALIZATION FOR EVALUATION (2011), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/
storage/documents/Emergency_Hospitalization_for_Evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/76ER-
YGZN]. 
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treatment for their conditions while confined.47 Therefore, it is critical 
to consider the history and procedures of civil commitment, 
population-wide mental health and substance abuse data, and 
alterations to the Miranda custody standard to understand why the 
current one-size-fits-all test is not adequate to ensure the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination for this 
group. In brief, equalizing the competing public and private interests 
requires more robust protection for the involuntarily committed. 
A. The Involuntary Commitment Process 
State standards for involuntary commitment show why the 
involuntarily committed merit a presumption of custody. Under 
North Carolina law, an individuals must undergo a four-step process 
before being committed.48 First, a petition must be submitted to a 
magistrate indicating that the individual is mentally ill and either a 
danger to themselves or others, or “in need of treatment in order to 
prevent further disability or deterioration that would predictably 
result in dangerousness.”49 Second, if a magistrate finds grounds for 
involuntary commitment, the individual is taken into custody for an 
initial examination.50 The individual is held at a twenty-four-hour 
facility until the second examination occurs.51 If no such facility is 
available, the individual can be held in custody up to seven days, 
which is renewable upon subsequent allegations.52 Third, if 
commitment is recommended by the first evaluator, a second 
 
 47. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1975) (declining to confirm the 
lower court’s decision that a “person confined against his will at a state mental institution 
has a ‘constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a 
reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition’” (quoting 
Donaldson v. O’Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975))). 
 48. BENJAMIN M. TURNAGE, JOHN RUBIN & DOROTHY T. WHITESIDE, NORTH 
CAROLINA CIVIL COMMITMENT MANUAL 14–15 (John Rubin ed., 2d ed. 2011). Because 
Hammonds was admitted for mental illness, Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 159, 804 S.E.2d at 
440, the process discussed above is specific to mental illness, though the process for 
substance abuse commitment is generally the same or similar, TURNAGE ET AL., supra, at 
72. 
 49. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 18. 
 50. See id. at 14. 
 51. See id. at 26. 
 52. See id. at 25–26 (adding that the most problematic aspect of the process at this 
stage is that, as was the case in Hammonds, an individual does not have to be present at 
the initial custody hearing if they are transported to the hospital in an emergency 
situation, such as an intentional overdose). Although Hammonds was admitted for an 
intentional overdose, he was designated as mentally ill rather than a substance abuser. 
Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 159, 804 S.E.2d at 440. 
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examination must be performed within twenty-four hours of the 
individual’s arrival at the facility.53 Notably, a respondent could be 
taken into custody, recommended by the first evaluator for 
commitment, and held for up to seven days if no twenty-four-hour 
facility is available, all before the second evaluation is conducted.54 
Court-ordered inpatient treatment can be instituted for up to ninety 
days, must be administered at a twenty-four-hour facility,55 and can be 
renewed for an additional 180 days.56 Rehearings after the second 
commitment can extend the individual’s commitment for up to a year 
and can be renewed indefinitely.57 
In practice, involuntary commitment burdens the committed 
individual’s liberty interests, and commitment procedures could 
better protect the rights of the involuntarily committed. For example, 
people taken into custody and evaluated for involuntary commitment 
are entitled to counsel during the proceedings.58 According to the 
North Carolina Civil Commitment Manual, counsel is provided due to 
the “significant infringement on a respondent’s liberty interest”59 and 
the restriction on the individual’s “freedom of movement.”60 
Nonetheless, as discussed below, the right is not guaranteed from the 
outset of the proceedings. Entitlement to counsel, the principal means 
of legal protection for the involuntarily committed, should therefore 
be more safely guarded because of the liberty interests at stake. 
Although the involuntarily committed do receive counsel during 
hearings if they cannot obtain their own, they are not entitled to 
representation until after admittance to a twenty-four-hour facility—a 
period of custody that can last up to seven days.61 Generally, those 
subject to commitment are appointed counsel after their second 
evaluation, long after they have already been detained.62 As a result, 
the appointment of counsel may be delayed when there is not a 
twenty-four-hour facility that can house the individual.63 Even more 
alarming is that these seven-day detentions can be renewed 
 
 53. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 26. 
 54. Id. at 25–26. 
 55. Id. at 50–51. 
 56. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	122C-276(e) (Supp. 2018). 
 57. Id. §	122C-276(f). 
 58. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 13. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 14. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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indefinitely as an evaluator can “begin the commitment process with 
a new petition and affidavit and new allegations.”64 Thus involuntarily 
committed individuals may be held for long periods without access to 
counsel. Should police arrive to ask questions during this period, they 
are at a disadvantage without an attorney and are particularly 
susceptible to coercion by police. Without even basic legal protection 
during this seven-day period, a custody per se designation is the most 
administrable and effective way to protect the rights of the 
involuntarily committed. 
B. Origins of the Modern Involuntary Commitment Process 
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence provides the basis 
for state standards on involuntary commitment. Prior to 1975, state 
standards regarding involuntary commitment ranged from requiring a 
showing of mental illness and “dangerousness” to proving that a 
nondangerous individual was mentally ill and a pauper.65 In 1975, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson66 solidified the 
former as the baseline standard that a state must show to subject an 
individual to the involuntary commitment process.67 Although the 
Court declined to determine whether a patient ordered to the care of 
a state hospital has a constitutional right to treatment, it ruled in the 
patient’s favor, explaining that “[a] finding of ‘mental illness’ alone 
cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his will and 
keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement.”68 The 
Court briefly addressed public policy concerns by explaining that 
stigma against the mentally ill does not justify the deprivation of 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Dan Moon, The Dangerousness of the Status Quo: A Case for Modernizing Civil 
Commitment Law, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 209, 212 (2014). For further discussion of the 
history of involuntary commitment, see id. at 211–15. 
 66. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
 67. Id. at 576; see also Moon, supra note 65, at 212 (“The modern history of 
involuntary commitment began with .	.	. O’Connor v. Donaldson in 1975 .	.	. holding that in 
order to constitutionally commit and confine an individual, the state must show that the 
person is dangerous to himself or others and that they are not capable of living safely 
under the supervision of family or friends.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 68. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. Donaldson sued the superintendent of a Florida state 
hospital alleging “intentional[] and malicious[]” deprivation of his “constitutional right to 
liberty” when he was held as a mentally ill patient in a state hospital for fifteen years solely 
for being mentally ill. Id. at 565. Donaldson asserted that he could not be involuntarily 
committed because “he was dangerous to no one, that he was not mentally ill, and that, at 
any rate, the hospital was not providing treatment for his supposed illness.” Id.  
97 N.C. L. REV. 1014 (2019) 
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liberty that the involuntarily committed experience.69 The Court 
ultimately held that “a State cannot constitutionally confine without 
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in 
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family 
members or friends.”70 Finding no evidence that Donaldson was a 
danger to himself or anyone, the Court ruled in his favor.71 
The “dangerousness” standard created by the Court in 
Donaldson still guides state law on involuntary commitment.72 The 
Donaldson decision and subsequent state legislative action show that 
civil commitment implicates weighty societal interests ranging from 
due process and welfare concerns to societal safety. By raising the 
standard for many states, the Court improved the due process based 
protections of mentally ill individuals by ensuring that they could only 
be taken into custody if they are a danger to themselves or society. 
The Court, however, also showed that the primary purpose for 
involuntary commitment is the safety of the public, not the treatment 
of committed individuals, since it allows for the confinement of an 
individual despite not being convicted of a crime and does not 
guarantee a right to treatment. For these reasons, appropriate legal 
precautions, such as a per se custody designation, should be 
implemented to adequately protect the rights of the civilly committed, 
equalizing the interests of public safety and personal liberty. The legal 
procedures for involuntary commitment show just how significantly 
an individual’s right to liberty is infringed during the commitment 
process, and why the scale of public and private benefit currently 
weighs against the private interest of personal liberty. 
The facts of Hammonds provide an apt example. North 
Carolina’s emergency involuntary commitment statute, which was 
 
 69. Id. at 576. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 573. 
 72. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §	22-52-91(a) (Westlaw through Act 2018-579) (requiring an 
individual to be mentally ill and pose an immediate danger to themselves or others); CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE §	5150(a) (West Supp. 2019) (requiring that a person suffering from 
a mental disorder be “a danger to others, or to himself or herself”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
16, §	5003(c)(2) (2017) (requiring that “the psychiatrist believes the individual presents a 
danger to self or danger to others”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §	573.001(a) 
(Westlaw through 2017 Reg. and 1st Sess. of the 85th Leg.) (requiring a showing of 
“mental illness” and “a substantial risk of serious harm to the person or to others unless 
the person is immediately restrained”). For a compilation of each state’s emergency 
involuntary commitment statutes, see generally TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., supra 
note 46; and Baumgarten, supra note 45, at 602 (discussing how states had to adhere to the 
“‘dangerousness’ model” following the Donaldson decision). 
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applied to Hammonds, provides that anyone “who is mentally ill and 
either (i) dangerous to self .	.	. or others .	.	. or (ii) in need of 
treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration that 
would predictably result in dangerousness” may be taken into custody 
and evaluated for involuntary commitment.73 Once these 
requirements are met and the individual is taken into custody, 
involuntary commitment procedures are triggered and the State must 
find “by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the respondent is 
mentally ill and dangerous to self .	.	. or dangerous to others” in order 
to continue confining the individual.74 The magistrate ordered 
Hammonds’s commitment on the basis that he was a danger to 
himself and mentally ill when he intentionally overdosed, subjecting 
him to the processes described above.  
Hammonds’s case provides practical insight into how swiftly the 
state is willing to act in instances when a potentially mentally ill 
individual may be dangerous to himself or others and, thus, subject to 
state control. While public safety is a valid justification for 
involuntary commitment, more can be done to protect the individual 
liberty side of the scale to achieve equilibrium without disrupting 
current procedures that protect the public. Moreover, there is a 
judicial avenue by which a court can achieve this equilibrium by using 
a custody per se designation. 
C. Miranda Custody Has Changed 
The custody analysis in Hammonds shows that there is room to 
create a new standard for certain groups.75 Thus, the “rigid” nature of 
 
 73. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	122C-261(a) (2017). The criteria for dangerousness to self 
includes an inability, “without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not 
otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his 
daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal 
or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety” as well as “a reasonable probability 
of his suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future unless adequate 
treatment is given pursuant to this Chapter.” Id. §	122C-3(11)(a). Dangerous to others  
means that within the relevant past, the individual has inflicted or attempted to 
inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in such 
a way as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or has 
engaged in extreme destruction of property; and that there is a reasonable 
probability that this conduct will be repeated.  
Id. §	122C-3(11)(b).  
 74. Id. §	122C-268(j). 
 75. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–72 (2011) (altering the totality-of-
the-circumstances test for minor defendants). 
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Miranda is not necessarily immutable.76 In Hammonds, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina relied on precedent that previously altered 
the “analysis in cases where a minor is the defendant.”77 In J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina,78 the Supreme Court of the United States considered 
a child’s age when analyzing “the relevant circumstances of the 
interrogation.”79 Although the Court in J.D.B. did not consider a 
custody per se designation, its decision deviated from the one-size-
fits-all approach, partly because children are “most susceptible to 
influence”80 and because a “determination of .	.	. youth” does not 
involve considering the subjective “‘mindset’ of any particular 
child.”81  
The J.D.B. decision is significant for two reasons. First, it shows 
that the Court is willing to alter the test to determine custody in 
general—Miranda is not a hard-and-fast rule equally applied to all 
groups. Second, the Court is willing to adapt the test when a 
vulnerable class of people, susceptible to influence, is at risk of police 
coercion. Given the run in the fabric of the totality-of-the-
circumstances test caused by J.D.B., the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina could have pulled the thread to create a new standard for 
involuntarily committed individuals without drastically departing 
from precedent. 
Individuals committed for mental illness, while categorically 
different from children in many respects, experience many of the 
same legal restrictions as children due to a similar susceptibility to 
influence.82 Therefore, the basis for changing the custody standard for 
children can be applied to this different but similarly restricted group. 
Many legal disqualifications applied to children are similarly applied 
to people with mental illness. Generally, individuals under the age of 
eighteen are “subject to the supervision and control” of their 
 
 76. Id. at 282 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Miranda court set down rigid standards 
that often require courts to ignore personal characteristics that may be highly relevant to a 
particular suspect’s actual susceptibility to police pressure.”). 
 77. Id. at 281 (majority opinion) (holding that courts must consider “all of the 
relevant circumstances of the interrogation,” including the age of the defendant when he 
or she is a minor). 
 78. 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
 79. Id. at 281. 
 80. Id. at 275 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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parents.83 Similarly, for the involuntarily committed, individuals are 
admitted and held at a twenty-four-hour facility while they await their 
second medical evaluation and judicial review and are committed if 
found to be mentally ill and a danger to themselves or others.84 As a 
result, an involuntarily committed individual, particularly one who is 
indigent, is subject to the supervision and control of the state when 
they are taken into custody and admitted to a twenty-four-hour 
facility. Additionally, both the mentally ill and children are limited in 
their ability to contract, suggesting the inability of either to fully grasp 
the gravity of certain legal decisions.85  
Moreover, involuntarily committed individuals are subject to the 
will of guardians who have powers of attorney.86 Where a child’s 
parent may be able to advocate on their behalf in a custodial 
interrogation,87 an involuntarily committed person must rely on a 
nurse or other healthcare professional to act in their best interests.88 
Where a child may not be mature enough to make certain decisions 
on her own, the involuntarily committed have certain legal 
disqualifications imposed upon them because of their inability to care 
for themselves as evidenced by the commitment order.89 
Because of the aforementioned legal disqualifications, the 
involuntarily committed are “susceptible to influence” not unlike 
children. Since someone is legally impaired as long as they are 
involuntarily committed, they are similarly “susceptible to influence” 
by law enforcement officials because they may fear reprisal due to 
psychiatric conditions.90 Since “the modern practice of custodial 
interrogation could be psychologically coercive, rather than just 
physical,” additional protections should be made for individuals who 
 
 83. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7B-3400 (2017). Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the 
general rule. See id. §	7B-3402 (listing exceptions to parental supervision and control if an 
individual under the age of eighteen is married, in the armed forces, or emancipated). 
 84. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 2. 
 85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §	12 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 86. TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 2 (stating that a “legally responsible person” 
can be defined as a “guardian” in the case of “an adult, who has been adjudicated 
incompetent”). 
 87. See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273 n.6. 
 88. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 2. 
 89. See id. at 3. 
 90. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 512 (2012); State v. Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. 
602, 611–12, 777 S.E.2d 359, 366 (2015), rev’d, 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017); 
TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 3. 
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have psychological ailments or issues beyond modifying the totality-
of-the-circumstances test.91 
So why not make mental illness a “relevant circumstance” of the 
interrogation and apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test to the 
mentally ill as was done in J.D.B.?92 This solution would not work for 
the mentally ill because it would require law enforcement to look into 
the subjective mindset of individuals.93 A finding that someone is a 
minor, on the other hand, involves drawing on an experience that 
everyone has had and what “any parent knows.”94 Being a minor is a 
relatable aspect of being human—there is a universal understanding 
that children cannot comprehend the consequences of some actions.95 
Mental illness is a far more amorphous concept, as evidenced by 
extensive cataloguing of different disorders.96 Childhood, by contrast, 
is a measurable and finite condition. By law, an individual typically 
reaches the age of majority at eighteen.97 Alternatively, from a legal 
perspective, mental illness can be indefinite, as evidenced by civil 
commitment procedures. Therefore, since a protection must be 
offered for involuntarily committed individuals because of their 
susceptibility to influence, and since applying the totality-of-the-
circumstances cannot be done without entering the subjective mindset 
of the mentally ill, a legal protection should take the form of a bright-
line presumption. 
 
 91. Then, supra note 13, at 846. 
 92. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 281. 
 93. Mental illness may be grouped into two categories: any mental illness and serious 
mental illness. Bose et al., supra note 46. People with any mental illness are “defined as 
having any mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder in the past year that met DSM-IV 
criteria,” while people with serious mental illness experience “any mental, behavioral, or 
emotional disorder that substantially interfere[s] with or limited one or more major life 
activities.” Id. The DSM-V now lists over 250 mental disorders. See generally AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
(5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V]. 
 94. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., DSM-V, supra note 93, at xiii–xxxiv.  
 97. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	48A-2 (2017) (“A minor is any person who has not reached the 
age of 18 years.”). But see id. §	7B-3402 (“This Article shall not apply to any juvenile 
under the age of 18 who is married or who is serving in the Armed Forces of the United 
States, or who has been emancipated.”). 
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III.  THE FLAW IN REJECTING CUSTODY PER SE AND THE BRIGHT-
LINE PROPOSAL 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina erred in applying the 
reasoning from another custody per se case and in concluding that 
involuntary commitment does not warrant a custody per se standard. 
This part will first discuss the United States Supreme Court’s reason 
for denying custody per se for prisoners and the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina’s use of that decision to reject the same approach for 
the involuntarily committed. Next, it will show how the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina failed to adequately consider the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning when applying the principles to the involuntarily 
committed. Finally, it explains how a bright-line custody rule for the 
involuntarily committed would function without implicating the 
concerns that many may have for bestowing a custody per se 
determination. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Rejection of Custody Per Se for Prisoners 
The Supreme Court has confronted the validity of custody per se 
designations in a context other than involuntary commitment.98 In 
Howes v. Fields,99 the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant 
was in custody per se when he was removed from the general prison 
population and questioned; it determined he was not.100 In Fields, two 
armed sheriff’s deputies questioned Fields while he was incarcerated 
for a crime that occurred prior to his imprisonment.101 The deputies 
escorted Fields to a separate interrogation room outside of the 
general population of the prison. There, the officers questioned him 
about allegations of sexual misconduct against a minor.102 At the 
beginning of the five-hour interview, the officers informed Fields that 
he could leave and return to his cell at any time and did not place him 
in handcuffs.103 The officers reminded Fields that he was free to leave 
and return to his cell even after he became agitated when confronted 
with the allegations.104 Ultimately, Fields confessed to the allegations 
 
 98. E.g., Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 504 (2012) (stating that the Sixth Circuit ruled 
a prisoner was in custody per se when he was “isolate[ed] from the general prison 
population combined with questioning about conduct occurring outside the prison”). 
 99. 565 U.S. 499 (2012). 
 100. Id. at 504, 508. 
 101. Id. at 502–03. 
 102. Id. at 502. 
 103. Id. at 503. 
 104. Id. 
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of sexual misconduct, but challenged the admissibility of his 
confession because he was not read his Miranda rights during 
questioning.105 He argued that he was in custody because, during the 
course of the interview, he no longer wished to speak with the 
deputies.106 Nonetheless, he did not return to his cell or request to do 
so.107 
On these facts, the Court, balancing the totality of the 
circumstances, found law enforcement did not subject Fields to a 
custodial interrogation.108 The Court noted that Fields’s ability to 
return to his cell and the lack of physical restraint outweighed the 
facts that the deputies were armed, the interview extended well after 
Fields’s bedtime and that Fields was incarcerated.109 
The Court found Fields was not in custody under the totality-of-
the-circumstances test after first dispensing with the custody per se 
designation adopted by the Sixth Circuit.110 The Court rejected 
wholesale the Sixth Circuit’s custody per se finding for three reasons: 
(1) authorities questioning a prisoner do not induce “the shock that 
very often accompanies arrest,” (2) an incarcerated person knows 
that they are in prison for a fixed amount of time and “is unlikely to 
be lured into speaking” to be released sooner, and (3) prisoners know 
that law enforcement probably has no control to lengthen or shorten 
their prison terms.111 Justice Alito concluded his discussion of the 
rejection of custody per se by stating that “a term of imprisonment, 
without more,” falls outside of the ambit of Miranda custody.112 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected a 
custody per se designation for the involuntarily committed by making 
an analogy to the Fields decision.113 The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina adhered to the United States Supreme Court rule that 
“imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation 
 
 105. Id. at 504. 
 106. Id. at 503–04. 
 107. Id. at 504. 
 108. Id. at 514–15. 
 109. Id. at 514–15. 
 110. Id. at 508–09 (explaining that the custody determination is not categorically rule 
based but rather a consideration of whether, “in light of ‘the objective circumstances of 
the interrogation,’ a ‘reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to 
terminate the interrogation and leave’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Stansbury v. 
California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per curiam); then quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 
U.S. 99, 112 (1995))). 
 111. Id. at 511–12. 
 112. Id. at 512. 
 113. See State v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 163, 804 S.E.2d 440, 443 (2017). 
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within the meaning of Miranda,”114 but failed to consider the 
reasoning behind the rejection of a custody per se designation in this 
new situation.115 In brief, the Supreme Court of North Carolina erred 
in likening imprisonment to involuntary commitment. 
B. Involuntary Commitment and Imprisonment Are Not Analogous 
for Purposes of Miranda Custody Analysis 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina erroneously analogized to 
the prisoners in Fields when considering whether Miranda protections 
should automatically apply to the involuntarily committed. In its 
analysis in Hammonds, the Supreme Court of North Carolina drew 
on a commonality between prisoners and those involuntarily 
committed—the limitation on the “freedom of movement” by 
circumstances not connected to the interrogation—to dispense with 
the custody per se discussion.116 However, the lack of consideration of 
the reasoning in Fields leaves open the inquiry into whether 
involuntarily committed individuals really should be treated the same 
as prisoners. With this inquiry left open, this section demonstrates 
that the same assumptions made by the Fields Court for incarcerated 
persons do not apply to the involuntarily committed for purposes of 
determining custody. 
1.  Involuntarily Committed Individuals May Be Lured into Speaking 
and May Not Know Who Determines Custody 
One who is involuntarily committed could be “lured into 
speaking by a longing for prompt release.”117 Unlike prisoners, 
individuals committed for mental illness in North Carolina are 
confined for generally shorter periods of time that are renewable at 
the end of each period.118 An individual’s commitment status depends 
on subsequent physician evaluation and a judicial order releasing or 
extending commitment.119 But nothing in the process, at least under 
North Carolina law, is designed to ensure that an individual 
understands this process until the individual receives counsel at the 
 
 114. See id. at 165, 804 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting Fields, 565 U.S. at 511). 
 115. See id. at 165–66, 804 S.E.2d at 443 (analyzing the factors considered by the Sixth 
Circuit and its conclusion, but failing to address why those factors were considered). 
 116. See id. at 166, 804 S.E.2d at 444. 
 117. Fields, 565 U.S. at 511. 
 118. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 57 (stating that increasing periods of 
confinement may culminate in “commitment .	.	. for a total of 365 days”). 
 119. Id. at 3. 
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second evaluation stage.120 Therefore, an involuntarily committed 
individual could cooperate with authorities believing that doing so 
will prove he is no longer impaired and is ready to be released or 
treated on an outpatient basis.121  
Granted, opponents of a custody per se designation could argue 
that if an individual believed that the medical staff, and not the 
authorities, had the power to release them, this could weigh against 
finding that the person was in custody under the totality-of-the 
circumstances. While it is possible that an involuntarily committed 
individual could believe this to be true at the outset, efforts to 
convince medical staff will prove fruitless because, ultimately, a judge 
decides whether or not a committed person should be released.122 
Since a committed individual’s initial attempts to try to convince 
medical staff to release him will be ineffective, he would probably be 
lured into speaking to other people he comes in contact with, 
including law enforcement. 
Finally, an involuntarily committed individual may not 
understand the legal process behind their commitment, having not 
been read their rights nor given the benefits of counsel prior to 
confinement in the way that criminal defendants are, and additionally 
are unable to care for themselves as a matter of law.123 An 
involuntarily committed individual is less likely to know who has the 
authority to shorten or lengthen their sentence and, therefore, is not 
similarly situated to incarcerated individuals.124 This is because, as 
stated above, the right to counsel exists for the involuntarily 
committed only after the individual is taken into custody, and they 
typically do not receive counsel until their second evaluation—after 
potentially having been in custody for seven days.125 Therefore, the 
involuntarily committed are not similarly situated as prisoners to the 
extent that they could be lured into speaking to anyone, including law 
 
 120. Id. at 13–14 (stating that a person who is being involuntarily committed “has the 
right to counsel through all stages of the proceedings” but in most cases “counsel is [not] 
appointed [until] after the [person’s] second evaluation”). 
 121. See id. at 15 (recognizing that outpatient commitment “involves less restriction of 
freedom and fewer collateral consequences than an inpatient commitment”). 
 122. See id. at 3 (explaining that “regardless of the physician’s or eligible psychologist’s 
request,” the court is free to determine which type of commitment is to be ordered). 
 123. See State v. Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. 602, 623, 777 S.E.2d 359, 372–73 (2015) 
(Inman, J., dissenting), rev’d, 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017). 
 124. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 13–14 (noting respondent’s right to 
counsel while acknowledging that appointment of counsel is often delayed for as many as 
seven days after the respondent’s initial detention). 
 125. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
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enforcement, and they do not have reason to know who makes the 
decision as to their commitment status. 
2.  An Involuntarily Committed Individual Would Experience “the 
Shock that Very Often Accompanies Arrest” When Questioned by 
Authorities 
The Fields Court expounded on the “shock” concept by 
explaining that it involves “a sharp and ominous change” that results 
in a person being “cut off from his normal life and companions.”126 
Further, the Court stated that the “expected and familiar” aspects of 
imprisonment “do not involve the same ‘inherently coercive 
pressures’” that a person who is questioned by authorities outside of 
prison may experience in the same setting. The civil commitment 
process, on the other hand, represents a sharp and ominous change 
because it cuts people off from their normal life and companions, and 
involves the same inherently coercive pressures present at the station 
house in Miranda. Involuntarily committed individuals are taken to 
an emergency room against their will and held with less judicial 
process than prisoners. As a result, civilly committed individuals 
would experience the shock that accompanies arrest when 
questioned. Consequently, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
erred when it arbitrarily analogized imprisonment to involuntary 
commitment. 
They also experience shock upon being questioned by authorities 
because an involuntarily committed individual does not have the 
same procedural protections as a prisoner.127 Prisoners and the 
involuntarily committed both benefit from having a right to counsel 
but prisoners benefit from this right prior to being confined.128 
Prisoners are not so confined without being read their Miranda rights, 
being informed of the wrong they committed, and being afforded the 
right to be tried by their peers or pleading guilty. These protections 
ensure that the rights of prisoners are not infringed upon without 
adequate process. Further, the Fifth Amendment protection against 
double jeopardy ensures that prisoners are confined for a set period 
of time and for only one length of time for each crime.129 
 
 126. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 511 (2012). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 129. See id. amend. V. 
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Additionally, prisoners are generally confined for breaking the law in 
the past, not for potential harms they may cause in the future. 
In contrast, involuntarily committed individuals do not reap the 
benefit of a formal criminal process like incarcerated individuals.130 
As a result, involuntarily committed individuals often have no reason 
to be aware of their constitutional privilege to be free from compelled 
self-incrimination solely by way of the commitment process.131 
Whereas prisoners have been read their Miranda rights and had 
access to representation during trial, involuntarily committed 
individuals may be detained without being read their rights132 or 
attending the hearing.133 In addition, involuntary commitment is 
indefinite, unlike the sentencing requirements for prisoners. 
Moreover, the involuntarily committed are confined because of 
actions they may commit in the future, not crimes they have 
committed in the past. These differences expose the flaw in the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina’s reasoning in Hammonds because 
the court sidestepped these basic procedural differences when it 
rejected custody per se for the involuntarily committed. 
Involuntarily committed individuals, by law, are incapable of 
caring for themselves. They should not be charged with ensuring that 
their Fifth Amendment privilege is protected without being informed 
of their right to counsel for crimes that may have been committed 
beyond the actions that facilitated commitment. It follows that 
because individuals who cannot care for themselves also should not 
be charged with being aware of and protecting their rights, they 
would be shocked by police questioning in the hospital setting for this 
reason. Consequently, the transportation to a hospital and subsequent 
commitment would represent a sharp and ominous change because it 
cuts a person off from their normal life and companions in an 
unexpected manner that an individual is not informed of as it is 
happening. 
Further, the involuntarily committed are more like the civilian 
who is whisked to the station house in Miranda than the prisoner who 
 
 130. See State v. Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. 602, 623, 777 S.E.2d 359, 372–73 (2015) 
(Inman, J., dissenting) (“Unlike prison and jail inmates, who necessarily have been 
advised of their Miranda rights in the course of their prior arrests, and who often have had 
the benefit of counsel in the course of their criminal cases, involuntarily committed 
patients may have had no prior occasion to be so advised or even to think about their 
rights if approached by police.”), rev’d, 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 25–26. 
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is questioned by authorities while in prison, as in Fields.134 
Admittedly, the confinement in a hospital, on its face, may not seem 
to be an inherently coercive environment like an interrogation room. 
Some may argue that an involuntarily committed individual may not 
seem to be in a coercive, police-dominated environment just by being 
committed, since hospitals are not places where police questioning 
normally occurs.135 But being involuntarily committed is not like being 
a civilian in a hospital, because there is a legal restraint on leaving and 
moving about the hospital.136 In Hammonds’s case, he could not leave 
to use the restroom without supervision and had a designated “sitter” 
outside of his room at all times. While an individual may not 
understand they are in custody at the outset, the realization would 
almost certainly set in the moment an involuntarily committed 
individual had to use the restroom or attempted to leave the hospital. 
After all, under North Carolina law, “reasonable force” can be used 
to restrain individuals if they attempt to leave the twenty-four-hour 
facility137—a practice that sharply differs from the average civilian’s 
ability to refuse treatment and leave the hospital.138 Therefore, when 
police question an involuntarily committed individual, the hospital 
room transforms into the sort of interrogation setting Miranda was 
designed to protect against—a place where an individual is “deprived 
of his freedom of action in any significant way.”139 
The essence of the shock problem lies in the swiftness by which 
the setting can change into a coercive environment. As law 
enforcement begins to question a person whose autonomy is 
restricted, that individual’s situation represents the “sharp and 
ominous change” which “may give rise to coercive pressures” for the 
person being questioned.140 If an involuntarily committed individual 
were to try to leave, they would be unable to do so.141 And because 
the involuntary commitment process does not guarantee that 
 
 134. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 502 (2012).  
 135. See Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. at 623, 777 S.E.2d at 372 (Inman, J., dissenting) 
(“In the hospital cases cited by the majority, the defendant was in a medical facility on his 
own volition, not legally restrained in any way.”). 
 136. See id. (stating that the “circumstances of an involuntarily committed person are 
not the same as those of a typical hospital patient” because while both are in a medical 
facility, involuntarily committed individuals are legally restrained). 
 137. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	122C-251(e) (2017). 
 138. The ability to refuse treatment is implied by the doctrine of informed consent. See, 
e.g., id. §	90-21.13. 
 139. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). 
 140. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 511 (2012). 
 141. See id. 
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individuals will understand the terms of their confinement, 
involuntarily committed individuals would likely believe that they are 
being held for the same reason they are being questioned by police. 
At the onset of the interrogation, the individual’s setting more closely 
resembles the station house in Miranda than a prison cell. Thus, shock 
would set in. Where prisoners would have reason to know that they 
could not leave the prison and thus would not feel coerced in that 
environment, the exact opposite is true for involuntarily committed 
individuals. Where civilians would actually be able to leave, the 
involuntarily committed are prohibited from doing so. It follows that 
the involuntarily committed are at the mercy of the interrogating 
officers and, therefore, require a bright-line custody per se standard. 
C. A Bright-Line Test Is the Correct Solution 
A bright-line test for custody determinations is not a novel 
concept.142 The test functions by finding custody per se when a certain 
condition is met143 and allows for the presumption to be rebutted by 
law enforcement by showing that an exception applies.144 In addition, 
the custody per se designation would not disqualify an inquiry into 
whether there was an interrogation or whether the defendant 
supplied a “voluntar[y], knowing and intelligent[]” waiver of their 
right to counsel.145 Such tests have been proposed to protect 
prisoners146 and those who are subject to “particular coercive actions 
taken by law enforcement that are commonly associated with formal 
arrest,” otherwise known as “arrest-like restraints.”147 Although 
suggested, neither imprisonment nor an arrest-like-restraints method 
for extending custody per se has passed muster before the Supreme 
Court of the United States.148 
 
 142. See generally Then, supra note 13, at 845, 862–66 (proposing a bright-line test for 
custody based on arrest-like restraints imposed on defendants by law enforcement). 
 143. See Fields, 565 U.S. at 504 (explaining the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that “isolation 
from the general prison population combined with questioning about conduct occurring 
outside the prison makes any such interrogation custodial per se”); Then, supra note 13, at 
863 (“[A]ny individual subjected to arrest-like restraints—such as being placed in 
handcuffs or into the back of a police car, or having weapons drawn on him—is in custody 
for purposes of Miranda.”). 
 144. Then, supra note 13, at 863. 
 145. See id.; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). 
 146. See Fields, 565 U.S. at 504. 
 147. Then, supra note 13, at 844, 866. 
 148. See, e.g., Fields, 565 U.S. at 507–08. 
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A bright-line custody per se standard should be adopted for the 
involuntarily committed to preserve their Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination.149 Since rigidity is a core 
function of Miranda, other proposals for custody per se rules, such as 
the presence of arrest-like restraints, do not align as well with current 
jurisprudence. For instance, neither the Fields nor the Hammonds 
decision turned on whether the individual was restrained.150 In fact, 
both decisions were decided differently, despite neither defendant 
being restrained during interrogation. Yet an arrest-like restraints 
rule has been proposed as a means of finding custody for purposes of 
Miranda. With respect to individuals who are involuntarily 
committed, there is a stronger argument for a custody per se rule than 
an arrest-like-restraints rule because individuals’ civil commitment 
status is unambiguous.151 Civil commitment is based on a judicial 
order for someone to enter twenty-four-hour care against their will.152 
Therefore, the line would be drawn at whether the individual has 
attained the “legal status denoting the court-ordered treatment.”153 
Arrest-like restraints, on the other hand, are far less cut-and-dry and 
could range from the defendant being placed in handcuffs to having a 
weapon drawn on them.154 A civil commitment order would provide a 
simpler determination than other proposals for custody with little to 
no need for interpretation by the courts. 
D. Custody Per Se Does Not Manifest the Fears of Miranda 
Dissenters 
Likewise, a custody per se rule for the involuntarily committed 
would not greatly affect the current tests, as some have feared.155 
Imposing a bright-line custody per se standard for the involuntarily 
committed would not be applicable to a large population. Despite 
mental illness affecting millions of Americans, only a small fraction 
 
 149. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 150. See Fields, 565 U.S. at 515; State v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 163, 804 S.E.2d 440, 
442 (2017). 
 151. See Then, supra note 13, at 866. 
 152. TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 2. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Then, supra note 13, at 863. 
 155. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S 261, 283 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(warning that changes to the totality-of-the-circumstances test may force the Court “to 
effect a fundamental transformation of the Miranda custody test—from a clear, easily 
applied prophylactic rule into a highly fact-intensive standard resembling the voluntariness 
test that the Miranda Court found to be unsatisfactory”). 
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are civilly committed.156 Further, no other group is both similarly 
restricted in freedom of movement and as susceptible to influence as 
are the involuntarily committed. The combination of the two 
characteristics makes the involuntarily committed a unique group in 
need of a bright-line rule presuming custody. Accordingly, other 
groups seeking application of this designation would likely fall short 
because they would not be able to show similar government-imposed 
confinement and a class-wide susceptibility to influence. Regardless, 
if another class were able to show the same type of vulnerability that 
the involuntarily committed experience, a custody per se designation 
should not be foreclosed on that group altogether. 
Those who oppose altering the totality-of-the-circumstances test 
or who oppose Miranda rights altogether may shudder at the idea of 
creating a custody per se rule for any group.157 However, the fear is 
unfounded because the custody per se rule would allow the totality-
of-the-circumstances test to remain intact for all other groups not 
similarly restrained. Thus, while J.D.B. offers a legal basis for 
proposing a change to the standard, the elevated vulnerability of the 
civilly committed allows the custody per se rule to keep from further 
muddying the waters by altering the custody standard for only one 
group. 
Additionally, the interests in general societal security, “swift and 
sure apprehension” as a means of deterrence, and rehabilitation 
espoused by Justice White in his dissent in Miranda are either served 
or unaffected by this rule.158 Unlike those who are “whisked” from 
their homes159 and questioned at a police station, the involuntarily 
committed will still be confined to the facility even if they do not 
 
 156. While North Carolina does not compile data on the number of civil commitments 
in the state, other states do. See generally AA ALLEN & JK BONNIE, UNIV. OF VA. INST. 
OF LAW, PSYCHIATRY & PUB. POLICY, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: ADULT CIVIL 
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS IN VIRGINIA FYI 2015 (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/589a1500893fc0cdfe2b5fc5/t/58a3606fd1758eb85565da95/1487102064073/AnnualReport_F
Y15_Adults.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4LF-F9XW]; CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., 
CALIFORNIA INVOLUNTARY DETENTIONS DATA REPORT: FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2015–
2016 (2017), https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/MH/Documents/FMORB/FY15-16_Involuntary_
Detentions_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2FV-DLKK]; Annette McGaha, Paul G. Stiles & 
John Petrila, Emergency Involuntary Psychiatric Examinations in Florida, PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVS., Sept. 2002, at 1171. 
 157. See J.D.B., 564 U.S at 281–82 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing an alteration to the 
totality-of-the-circumstances” test as “fundamentally inconsistent” with providing a “clear 
rule”); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) 
(stating that there is no precedent for the procedural safeguards offered by Miranda). 
 158. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 539–41 (White, J., dissenting).  
 159. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 499 (2012). 
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cooperate with authorities.160 Thus, they will not be free to harm 
another by refusing to answer questions for the authorities. 
Moreover, deterrence is unaffected because the custody per se rule 
would only apply to individuals who are already confined and, 
therefore, already “apprehended” to a degree.161 Finally, 
rehabilitation is not affected because the very nature of involuntary 
commitment is to receive “treatment .	.	. for mental health or 
substance abuse.”162 So while judges who differ in their approaches to 
implementing Miranda have been reluctant to allow for a custody per 
se rule,163 it is time to create a new standard to protect this vulnerable 
group. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the core foundations of Miranda is that it “places a high 
value on clarity and certainty.”164 However, the need for clarity and 
certainty cannot be achieved at the expense of a right that is 
“fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege.”165 For 
those who are involuntarily committed, the current test is applied too 
broadly and does not offer precautions to guard them from coercion. 
Since Miranda and its progeny have hardly budged in considering 
“whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning 
being given,”166 a bright-line test presuming custody preserves the 
objectivity of Miranda and protects the interests of the involuntarily 
committed. By analogizing involuntarily committed individuals to 
prisoners simply because both are “restrained,” the Hammonds court 
erred in unilaterally denying a custody per se rule for the 
involuntarily committed. And since involuntarily committed 
individuals are “susceptible to influence” but unable to benefit from a 
modified totality-of-the-circumstances test, they need this 
 
 160. By law, an individual committed on an inpatient basis for mental illness cannot be 
released until “the criteria for inpatient commitment are no longer met.” TURNAGE ET 
AL., supra note 48, at 52. 
 161. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 539–41 (White, J., dissenting). 
 162. TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 2. 
 163. Compare State v. Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. 602, 609, 777 S.E.2d 359, 365 (2015) 
(rejecting a custody per se rule for the involuntarily committed), rev’d, 370 N.C. 158, 804 
S.E.2d 438 (2017), with id. at 622, 777 S.E.2d at 372 (Inman, J., dissenting) (“I agree with 
the majority that the nature of involuntary commitment does not render police 
questioning custodial per se .	.	.	.”). 
 164. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 282 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 165. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. 
 166. Id. at 468. 
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presumption to protect their constitutional privilege to be free from 
compelled self-incrimination. In sum, a bright-line test for custody for 
the involuntarily committed preserves the rights protected by 
Miranda without disrupting the legal landscape Miranda is built upon. 
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